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consistent of those is demography, specifically demographic change and
difference. The demographic approach to international security leads to
strategic conclusions about the integration of military, political, and
economic means in pursuit of states’ ultimate objectives in the
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Introduction
To be successful, grand strategy requires objectives, concepts, and 
resources to be balanced appropriately with a view to defeating one's 
enemy. The trouble is, of course, that Generals are always well prepared 
to fight the last war. In the words of Yogi Beara, predictions are always 
difficult, especially when they involve the future. Yet, grand strategy is all 
Abstract
To be successful, grand strategy requires objectives, concepts, and 
resources to be balanced appropriately with a view to defeating one's 
enemy. The trouble is, of course, that Generals are always well prepared 
to fight the last war. In the words of Yogi Berra, predictions are always dif-
ficult, especially when they involve the future. Yet, grand strategy is all 
about the future. But how is one to strategize about a future that is inher-
ently difficult to predict? One way to overcome this conundrum is to rely 
on independent variables that can be projected into the future with rea-
sonable accuracy. Aside from environmental indicators, the most consis-
tent of those is demography, specifically demographic change and 
difference. The demographic approach to international security leads to 
strategic conclusions about the integration of military, political, and eco-
nomic means in pursuit of states' ultimate objectives in the international 
system.
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about the future. But how is one to strategize about a future that is inher-
ently difficult to predict? One way to overcome this conundrum is to rely 
on independent variables that can be projected into the future with rea-
sonable accuracy. Aside from environmental indicators, the most consis-
tent of those is demography, specifically demographic change and 
difference. The demographic approach leads to strategic conclusions 
about the integration of military, political, and economic means in pursuit 
of states' ultimate objectives in the international system. Similar to the 
youthful populations, rapid development, and urbanization that charac-
terized the first half of the nineteenth century, demographic develop-
ments of the twenty-first century are also raising the specter of systemic 
disorder, civil war, and political instability.1 Indeed, a recent intelligence 
forecast cautioned that "lagging economies, ethnic affiliations, intense 
religious convictions, and youth bulges will align to create a 'perfect 
storm' for internal conflict" in the near future.2 
Waxing and waning neo-Malthusian "end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it" 
gestations notwithstanding, demography had long been relegated to the 
epiphenomenal margins of grand strategy.3 Starting with Paul Kennedy's 
Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, followed by a wave of hawkish 
neo-conservative mongering about the perils of over-aging and immigra-
tion,4, 5 and spotlighted most recently in the U.S. National Intelligence 
Council's Global Trends 2025, fertility, mortality, and migration have 
been maturing in grand strategy as independent variables in their own 
right. Still, much of that literature feels a lot like neo-Nebuchadnezzarian 
harbingers of the devil's writing on the wall. Yet, the purpose of grand 
strategy is not to posit demography as destiny. The future is not necessar-
ily all that bleak. Provided that the strategic implications of demography 
are both understood and acted upon, we can fashion our world in accor-
dance with demographic change instead of having demographic change 
fashion our world for us.
The world is at a demographic crossroads. Throughout all of history, high 
birth rates ensured predominantly young populations with few older peo-
ple. War and epidemics, such as the plague, would intervene to depress 
population growth.6 By contrast, depressed population growth today is a 
function of a historically unprecedented decline in birth rates.7 That is, 
women are consistently having fewer or no children than at any previous 
time in history (for reasons that are beyond the scope of this article). 
Demographically, the world is entering virgin territory. On the one hand, 
demographic trends suggest that there will be more "heavy lifting" to do 
with respect to international security. On the other hand, some countries 
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are far better positioned to weather the impending demographic storm 
than others. Ergo, fewer countries will end up having to do more of the 
"heavy lifting" on security, and with fewer resources.
Some countries are better positioned vis-à-vis demographic change than 
others, and some will even have security benefits accrue to them, espe-
cially as a result of the continental multiplier effect in North America that 
is generated by virtue of the demographic advantage and concomitant 
economic growth enjoyed by the United States. In the context of slowing 
economic growth, increased costs of labor and defense spending, no state 
or combination of states appears likely to overtake the United States' posi-
tion of economic and military dominance. Haas argues that global popu-
lation aging is likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major 
powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' 
economic and military power lead), as these other states are likely to fall 
even farther behind the United States.8 These demographic developments 
suggest that there is no other country on the horizon that is able to muster 
the Americans' combination of innovation, economic growth, and low 
ratio of spending on capital versus personnel (which is key to military 
dominance on the high-tech battlefield of fourth generation warfare). 
Global population aging is thus likely to generate considerable security 
benefits for North America.
Geriatrics Security: Towards Kant's Perpetual 
Peace?
Rarely can analysts of politics claim to be documenting new phenomena. 
Population aging, however, is one of these revolutionary variables. Never 
before has humanity witnessed such dramatic, widespread aging among 
the world's most industrialized and powerful democracies. Two long-term 
demographic trends coincided to produce population aging: decreasing 
fertility rates and increasing life expectancy. Fertility rates refer to the 
average number of children born per woman in a given country. For a 
state to sustain its population (assuming zero net immigration), fertility 
levels must exceed about 2.1 children per woman. Today the United States 
is the sole liberal democracy that comes close to meeting this require-
ment. Most are well below this average and have been for decades.
As Figure 1 shows, the proportion of the world's population that resides in 
advanced industrialized democracies will continue to decline: from 24 
percent in 1980, to 18 percent today, and 16 percent by 2025. This is a 
remarkable reversal: Between 1700 and 1900, Europe's population and its 
overseas offshoots had doubled its proportion of the world's total popula-
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tion from 20 percent to 40 percent.9 As late as 1950, Europe, Japan, and 
North America together comprised roughly one-third of the world's popu-
lation, compared to one-fifth today and under one-seventh by 2050. By 
2030, that translates into an expected total increase of less than 40 mil-
lion people by 2030 (primarily concentrated in North America as 
Europe's overall population starts to shrink) as opposed to 1.5 billion peo-
ple in the rest of the world.
Source: UN World Population Prospects, 2008; for demographic scenarios see Jackson 
and Howe, 2008: Appendix 1, Section 3.
Figure 1:  Developed World Population as a Percentage of World Total
In absolute terms, India's population will grow the most (by 240 million 
to 1.45 billion people), followed by an increase of 100 million in China, for 
a total population of 1.3 billion. Growth will also be strong throughout 
Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Much of Eastern and Central 
Europe, Russia, Italy, and Japan, by contrast, will see their populations 
decline by as much as 10 percent. Bucking the trend are the traditional 
Anglo-Saxon settler countries, the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand, where population growth between 2010 and 2025 is pro-
jected to exceed 10 percent. Its current growth rate of 1.4 percent notwith-
standing, China's population, by contrast, is projected to start declining 
by 2025 (when it will officially be overtaken by India as the world's most 
populist country, although many demographers already believe India to 
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be more populous than China). Russia's population, by contrast, is pro-
jected to fall from 141 to 130 million by 2025 while its population ages 
rapidly.10 While these developments have but a moderate effect on the 
pecking order among the world's three most populous countries, Table 1 
shows that the impact on "the rise and fall" of other "great powers" (mea-
sured by population size) is marked.
Table 1: Largest Countries Ranked by Population Size, 1950, 2005, and 
2050
Source: Adapted from Jackson and Howe (2008); future rankings for select developed 
countries which are projected to fall below 12th place are indicated in parentheses.
Ranking 1950 2005 2050
1 China China India
2 India India China
3 United States United States United States
4 Russian Federation Indonesia Indonesia
5 Japan Brazil Pakistan
6 Indonesia Pakistan Nigeria
7 Germany Bangladesh Bangladesh
8 Brazil Russian Federation Brazil
9 UK Nigeria Ethiopia
10 Italy Japan DR Congo
11 Bangladesh Mexico Philippines
12 France Vietnam Mexico
(14) Germany (18) Japan
(20) France (26) Germany
(21) UK (27) France
(23) Italy (32) UK
(39) Italy
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By 2025, for instance, the number of women of child-bearing age will be 
barely half of what it is today. The drag on Russian productivity is 
expected to be considerable (although it will be offset in the short term by 
rising rents from Russia's vast wealth in natural resources). In fact, 
Vladimir Putin has referred to the precipitous decline of Orthodox Slavs 
as the country's greatest security threat: "The most acute problem facing 
Russia today is demography," he told the Kremlin in his 2006 State of the 
Union Address. This is caused by large swaths of land being already 
under-populated and a combination of higher fertility rates and migration 
by ethnic minorities that are poised to eclipse Orthodox Slavs.11 
The scope of the aging process is remarkable. By 2050, at least 20 percent 
of the population in allied countries, but also in China and Russia, will be 
over sixty-five. In Japan it will be as high as one-third of the population. 
By 2050 China alone will have more than 330 million people over sixty-
five. Population aging, as Table 2 shows, is accompanied by a diffusion of 
absolute population decline. Russia's population is already decreasing by 
500,000–700,000 people per year.
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Table 2: Countries Projected to Have Declining Populations, by Period 
of the Onset of Decline, 1981–2045
Source: Adapted from Jackson and Howe (2008); excludes countries with populations 
less than 1 million.
The trends projected in these data are largely irreversible and are highly 
accurate. The reason for this certainty is simple: the elderly of the future 
are already born. Put another way, anyone over the age of forty in 2050 
has already been born. Except for some global natural disaster, disease 
pandemic, or other worldwide calamity, the number of people in the 
world who are over sixty-five will grow exponentially over the coming 
decades. Even in democracies with comparatively good demographic 
prospects, the proportion of that cohort is projected to double by 2040.
Already declining Onset of decline: 
2009–2029
Onset of decline: 
2030–2050
Hungary (1981) Italy (2010) Azerbaijan (2030)
Bulgaria (1986) Slovakia (2011) Denmark (2031)
Estonia (1990) Bosnia & Herzegovina 
(2011)
Belgium (2031)
Georgia (1990) Greece (2014) Thailand (2033)
Latvia (1990) Serbia (2014) North Korea (2035)
Armenia (1991) Singapore (2035)
Romania (1991) Portugal (2016) Netherlands (2037)
Lithuania (1992) Cuba (2018) Switzerland (2040)
Ukraine (1992) Macedonia (2018) UK (2044)
Moldova (1993) Spain (2019) Puerto Rico (2044)
Belarus (1994) Taiwan (2019) Kazakhstan (2045)
Russian Federation 
(1994)
South Korea (2020)
Czech Republic (1995) Austria (2024)
Poland (1997) Finland (2027)
Germany (2006) China (2029)
Japan (2008)
Croatia (2008)
Slovenia (2008)
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Outgrowing the Age of Major International Conflict
Contrary to hawkish technological "fantasies" of high-tech international 
war,12 then, the probability of a major international war actually contin-
ues to diminish as the world's population grows older. Specifically, the 
demographic challenges faced by China and Russia make an international 
military conflict with America increasingly unlikely. Haas refers to this as 
"a geriatric peace."13 For the same reason, it is highly improbable that any 
disputes over the Arctic would ever escalate to the point of war. Global 
aging also increases the likelihood of continued peaceful relations 
between the United States and other great powers. Others have shown 
that the probability of international conflict grows when either the domi-
nant country anticipates a power transition in favor of a rising state or 
states, or when such a transition actually occurs.14 By adding substantial 
support to the continuation of U.S. hegemony, global aging counteracts 
either outcome. Thus, Haas surmises that an aging world decreases the 
probability that either hot or cold wars will develop between the United 
States and other great powers.15 
Raining on the Parade: When the Young and the 
Restless Move to the City, and Grow Old… before 
They Grow Rich
Despite the predictions of Haas, global population aging is likely to make 
the twenty-first century a particularly dangerous time for U.S. interna-
tional interests. Population aging will beset much of the world at some 
point this century. In fact, the aging problem in many developing states is 
likely to be as acute as for industrialized countries, but the former have 
the added disadvantage of growing old before growing rich, thus greatly 
handicapping their ability to pay for elder-care costs.16 For example, in 
China the comparative advantage associated with a large working-age 
population relative to a small proportion of children and elderly starts to 
wane around 2015, a problem that is further exacerbated by a growing 
excess of men over women.17 The ratio of working-age adults to elderly is 
projected to shrink from just under ten in 2000 to 2.6 by 2050 when 
China's median age is projected to be just over forty-five years of age. That 
median age will make China one of the oldest populations in the world—
older than Japan, the country with the oldest population today and a pro-
jected median age of forty-three by then.18 
If the strain on governments' resources caused by the cost of aging popu-
lations becomes sufficiently great, it has the potential to exacerbate sys-
tematically both the number of fragile states and the extent and depth of 
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that fragility. As fragile states are prospective havens for organized crime 
and terrorism, the prospect of having to contend with a proliferation of 
fragile states with fewer resources at the allies' disposal could prove the 
single greatest security challenge of this century.19 This is complemented 
by an already reduced capacity to realize other key international objec-
tives, including preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD), funding nation-building, engaging in military humanitarian 
interventions, and various other costly strategies of international conflict 
resolution and prevention.
Global population is expected to grow by 1.2 billion by 2025, an increase 
of not quite 20 percent from the current 6.8 billion. However, that is well 
below the rate of increase between 1980 and 2009 when the globe's popu-
lation grew by 2.4 billion. While the rate of growth may be slowing, the 
impact of the absolute growth is still staggering. The populations of fifty 
countries are projected to grow by a third, in some cases by two-thirds, by 
2025 (which, of course, places additional stress on natural resources, ser-
vices, and infrastructure). These are predominantly large, Islamic coun-
tries of 60 million people or more that are located primarily in sub-
Saharan Africa as well as the Middle East and South Asia. With the demo-
graphic transition progressing more rapidly in the Middle East and South 
Asia (Figure 2), the challenges associated with population growth, such as 
youth bulges, will be greatest in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Source: Leahy et al., 2007: 19.
Figure 2: The Global Population Structure, 1970–2025
Countries with so-called "youth bulges" (the proportion of the adult popu-
lation aged 15–29) are depicted in Figure 3.20 These countries have been 
shown to be at a greater risk for civil conflict due to strains on systems of 
schooling and socialization as well as un- or under-employment, concom-
itant propensity for deviance, and countries in which more than 60 per-
cent of the population is under thirty, have been shown to be four times as 
prone to civil war than countries with mature populations.21 
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Source: Cincotta et al, 2003: 42.
Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of the Youth Bulge, 2005
Another way to make the case for the correlation between fecundity, 
youth bulges, and the propensity for conflict is to examine the association 
between a country's position along the demographic transition and the 
outbreak of civil war (as shown in Figure 4): The further along a country's 
population is in the demographic transition, the lower the probability of 
civil war.
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Source: Cincotta et al., 2003: 28.22 
Figure 4: Demographic Transition and Onset of Civil War
Populations in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia will con-
tinue to grow and remain comparatively youthful; therefore, we can 
expect continued political instability and outmigration among those 
countries. Still, the youth bulge will be greatest in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Guatemala, Iraq, Ethiopia, 
Angola, Chad and Yemen, producing population growth rates of over 2% 
annually (see Table 3) with populations in those countries doubling every 
30–35 years. Even if fertility rates in Nigeria or Afghanistan were to 
decline, they are currently so high that, at best, each country might barely 
transition from a young to a youthful age structure by 2025.
Table 3: Fastest-Growing Countries 2005–2010 (at least 1 million 
people)
Country* Annual Growth Rate, %
Liberia 4.1
Niger 3.9
Afghanistan, Burkino Faso 3.4
Syria, Timor L'este, Uganda 3.3
Benin, Palestine (occupied) 3.2
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss4/7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.4.2
International Security Strategy and Global Population Aging
39
Eritrea 3.1
Jordan 3.0
Burundi, Tanzania, Yemen 2.9
Chad, Congo (DR), Gambia, 
Malawi, UAE
2.8
Angola, Rwanda, Madagascar, 
Sierra Leone
2.7
Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal 2.6
Guatemala, Togo 2.5
Kuwait, Mali, Mauritania, 
PNG, Zambia
2.4
Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia
2.3
Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Pakistan, 
Sudan
2.2
Ghana, Oman, Saudi Arabia 2.1
Honduras, Libya 2.0
Cen.Afr.Rep., Congo, Namibia, 
Nepal
1.9
Bolivia, Egypt, Gabon, Ireland, 
Laos, Paraguay, Philippines
1.8
Israel, Malaysia, Venezuela 1.7
Cambodia, Haiti, Panama, Tajiki-
stan
1.6
Algeria, Colombia 1.5
* Countries with 50 percent or more Muslim population in Bold.
Source: United Nations, 2008.
Country* Annual Growth Rate, %
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Although youth bulges are on the wane in the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia, by 2025 three-quarters of the countries with persistent youth bulges 
will be in sub-Saharan Africa. A key driver of this development is HIV/
AIDS, which delays the entry of populations with high incidence rates of 
infection through the demographic transition by compromising the eld-
erly portion of the population. So, the bulk of conflict and political insta-
bility will continue to be scattered across the Middle East, Asia, and some 
Pacific islands, but is likely to be concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Since conflict is the single greatest "push factor" of migration, immigra-
tion pressures from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe (but also to places such 
as South Africa, as Lindy Heinecken's 2001 micro-study on the subject 
has demonstrated) are expected to continue unabated and may accelerate 
as climate change makes life even less viable in that part of the world.
Migration and age structure have several connections, one of which is that 
the most mobile populations also tend to be youthful. That is, migrants 
are overwhelmingly between 15 and 35 years old. There are a number of 
reasons for this, but perhaps most importantly, these age groups stand to 
reap the greatest long-term payoff from migrating and they have the least 
to lose from being uprooted.
Owing to the compound effect of migration and fertility, mega-cities are 
likely to continue as the locus of youth bulges. Ergo, they are likely to 
become hubs of volatility with the population influx vastly exceeding 
employment prospects, thus overtaxing services.23 In fact, where the 
annual rate of urban population growth exceeds four percent, the proba-
bility of civil conflict has been found to be 40 percent; where the rate of 
growth is between one and four percent, it is half that at 20 percent, and 
where it is less than one percent it is 19 percent. In other words, dispro-
portionately high rates of urbanization are associated with a dispropor-
tionately high probability of civil conflict.
These migratory trends are also likely to cause growing disequilibria 
among ethnic populations, as the "sons of the soil" have to contend with 
an influx of other ethnic groups. Prominent examples where population 
differentials are already a source of conflict include Israel, Lebanon, and 
Nigeria, as well as native populations across the Americas and Oceania 
which register some of the highest fertility (and migratory) rates in the 
world.
The combination of significant (1) aging, (2) diversification of popula-
tions, and (3) a reversal of the urban-rural split (from 30–70 in 1950 to 
70–30 by 2050, cf. UN Secretariat 2008) is without historical precedent. 
Since urban populations are both younger and more diverse than rural 
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ones, one might also add a growing urban-rural divide and territorial dif-
ferentiation as subsidiary challenges. For the first time in history, more 
people now live in cities than in the countryside. As urban growth out-
paces national population growth by a factor of 1.5, the proportion of 
urban dwellers across the world is expected to rise to 57 percent by 2025. 
In the less-developed world, where population growth is greatest, how-
ever, three billion more people will live in cities (in addition to the 2.3 bil-
lion urban dwellers in 2005), a 50 percent increase from 42.7 percent in 
2005 to 67 percent by 2050. In sub-Saharan Africa, the growth will be 
three-fold, from 3,000 today to one billion by mid-century. While much 
attention has been focused on the growth of mega-cities, most of the 
urban growth is expected to transpire in secondary centers along migra-
tory crossroads.
When troops and reconstruction/development funds are deployed in the 
service of international security and stability, it will, in all likelihood, be in 
this part of the world. When expeditionary, civil-affairs and 
psychological-operations capabilities are concerned, allied armed forces 
need to prepare accordingly. Many of the West's immigrants originate in 
countries from this arc of instability. Given the likelihood of future 
involvement in the provision of security in this part of the world, 
diasporas will become increasingly important to mission success (and 
legitimacy).
In Search of…New Friends
Among her allies, America will be shouldering a growing fiscal burden of 
expenditures on international security as the United State's proportion of 
the developed world's population and GDP continues to rise (see Figure 
5).
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Cited in Jackson and Howe, 2008: Appendix 1, Section 5.
Figure 5: US Population and GDP (in 2005 PPP dollars), As a Percent-
age of Developed-World Totals (1950–2050).
Population aging will hamper the ability of a number of allies to "step up 
to the plate." Afghanistan may already provide some preliminary empiri-
cal evidence to this effect. Following the logic of relative population aging, 
the United States, Canada, the UK, and Australia are becoming relatively 
more important allies. As more countries, and especially NATO allies, face 
growing fiscal constraints, fewer allies will end up having to pay a growing 
share of the common international security interests. But even for those 
countries, which are relatively well-positioned, that will become increas-
ingly difficult as they face their own fiscal challenges growing out of popu-
lation aging. There will be a need to do more with less as population aging 
strains defense spending. Allied armed forces should not be expecting sig-
nificant increases in their budgets or personnel. As funds become even 
scarcer than they already are, careful strategic planning will be impera-
tive. For example, given the way international security will be developing, 
the potential need to deploy tanks is diminishing precipitously. With 
resources at a premium and personnel-to-capital expense ratio on the 
rise, the armed forces cannot afford procurement "errors". In light of ele-
vated and increasingly disproportionate personnel to capital ratios, 
armed forces will be disinclined to expand their troop strength. On the 
contrary, they will be reducing troop levels to free up money for develop-
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ment and procurement. This will be especially difficult in a tight labor 
market, which will cause the costs for highly qualified personnel to rise 
significantly.
In effect, the economic impact of population aging will challenge allied 
countries that lack the fiscal room necessary to maintain the extent of 
their global position and involvement, let alone adopt major new initia-
tives. Ergo, allies have little choice but to work actively through interna-
tional institutions to preserve and enhance soft power.24 Since the ability 
for NATO and its member countries to assert themselves on the ground 
will face mounting financial, personnel, and matériel constraints, the 
allies will have to maximize their returns from international institutions. 
Similarly, having to make do with less at home means allies will have to 
harness synergies among domestic institutions and government depart-
ments. The "whole-of-government" comprehensive approach is the 
future. As apprehensive as countries may be about contributing troops, as 
situations arise where they deem intervention is in their interest, fewer 
allies will be in a position to contribute; and those countries with more 
favorable demographic trends, such as Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, and also the UK, France, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian 
countries, should prepare themselves (both at the level of mass psychol-
ogy and operationally) to take on a greater share of the burden. This is not 
a normative observation but a sociological one: Among many of the tradi-
tional allies, the fiscal and defense capabilities are likely to erode further. 
So, if a country deems a given situation in need of intervention, it will 
have to put its money (and troops) where its mouth is.
Yet, as some traditional allies across Europe struggle in their ability to 
contribute financial and military prowess to international missions, coun-
tries further along the demographic transition in Latin and Central Amer-
ica (e.g., Brazil and Mexico) and Asia (e.g., India and China) will start to 
benefit from international migration's human-capital and technology-
transfer effect as educated and affluent expatriates return to their coun-
tries of origin. As populations throughout the Americas mature and their 
economies develop, their strategic significance grows. Preliminary evi-
dence to this end can be found in Mexican financial contributions to the 
reconstruction effort in Haiti as well as Brazil's military leadership in 
Haiti. Together, these countries will become cognizant that stable coun-
tries right across the continent are in their best interest as "pull" factors 
increase with improved economic conditions, and "push" factors such as 
political instability in Haiti, persist. So, collaboration across the Americas 
is likely to grow. Yet many countries in the Americas harbor suspicions 
about US interests and, for political reasons, do not want to be seen as too 
cozy with the United States. This should provide an interesting opportu-
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nity for "middle-power" allies, such as Canada and Australia, to expand 
their traditional role of honest broker and take on a continental leader-
ship role that should allow it to punch well above its weight.
Moreover, as youth bulges transition into bulges in the working-age popu-
lation, some Asian, Latin American, and North African countries have the 
potential to harness not only the economic returns of the demographic 
transition (Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2003) but also "democratic 
returns" (see Figure 6).25 
Source: Leahy et al. 2007: 25.
Figure 6: Age Structure and Governance
They include Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Chile, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. For 
instance, as Iran's population matures over the coming decade (and 
approximates China's current age structure with a large working-age pop-
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ulation but relatively few children and elderly), prospects for improved 
education and higher standards of living are likely to become an impetus 
for political moderation. Since Iran's population structure will be more 
mature than that of its neighbors, demographically, the risk of its initiat-
ing international war is actually on the wane.
Conclusion
Four substantive implications follow: First, demographic developments 
suggest that the high-tech fantasy of the "big war" with countries such as 
China and Russia that the hawks are fretting about is a strategic folly 
whose pursuit ties increasingly scarce demographic and financial 
resources to a wrong-headed vision. Second, time is on "our" side: Matur-
ing population structures will make some "rogue states," such as Iran, 
North Korea, and Venezuela, more politically stable. Third, youth bulges 
will emerge as a growing driver of political instability in select African, 
Middle Eastern, and Asian countries. Fourth, demographic convergence 
is providing a welcome opportunity to make new friends in the pursuit of 
global stability, especially in the Americas. Some of these claims have 
been advanced elsewhere. But the analytical implications for the strategic 
pursuit of soft power and new friends relative to the demographic context 
of political instability are novel.
The aging crisis is less acute in some countries than in others. Where it is 
less acute, countries have better prospects to shape international security 
according to their national interests. Still, the magnitude of the costs will 
be unprecedented (due to the compound effect of diminished overall con-
tributions and expanded demand), as will the constraints they will impose 
on defense spending. The more countries sustain their comparative 
demographic advantage and relatively superior ability to pay for the costs 
of their elderly population, the more we are likely to see a middle-power 
renaissance among those allied countries that continue to enjoy fairly 
favorable demographic developments. It is in the allies' strategic and 
defense interests to rein in the costs of old-age security and health care as 
much as possible, minimize the gap between elder-care obligations and 
resources set aside for them, raise the retirement age, and maintain as 
open an immigration policy as possible to keep their median age relatively 
low. Proactive policies that are designed both to take full advantage of the 
opportunities created by global aging while mitigating the costs created by 
this phenomenon will enhance international security through the twenty-
first century.
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The bad news is that demand for armed forces will grow as demographic 
determinants of domestic instability rise over the next twenty years. The 
good news is (1) that the demographic determinants of international war 
are on the decline and (2) that demographic projection allows us to pin-
point the likely hotspots. In other words, analysis of the demographic evi-
dence suggests that armed forces should prepare for international 
interventions rather than international war. If the dictum that the gener-
als are always well-prepared to fight the last war holds, then prevailing 
military strategy runs a real danger of having armed forces bet on the 
wrong horse. Owing to two competing trends, they will find it increasingly 
difficult to cope with growing demand for their services.
Maintaining the armed forces' functional imperative in a tightening labor 
market means substituting capital for labor. Increased strain on demo-
graphic and fiscal resources means smaller but more capable, effective, 
and professional armed forces. But with soldiers' median age on the rise, 
and defense spending atrophying under competing political priorities in 
democratic countries with aging populations, the inclination will be to 
shift armed forces' dwindling fiscal resources from capital to labor. Owing 
to nuanced demographic trends and political structures, the crowding out 
will be more rapid and severe in some countries than in others. The down-
side of this trend is that fewer countries will need to bring a greater pro-
portion of armed and fiscal resources to bear on a less secure world. The 
upside, however, is that demographic trends are also opening up opportu-
nities to look for new friends as partners in international security. These 
developments place a premium on soft power, which include being inten-
tionally strategic about international security regimes and institutions, 
and international collaboration among armed forces of traditional allies 
and demographically emerging powers.
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